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BARTER, CREDIT AND WELFARE: 




This paper develops a model to investigate the welfare implications of barter in Russia and other 
transition economies during the 1990s. We argue that barter is a welfare-improving phenomenon 
that acts as a defense mechanism against monetary instability.  When firms react to tighter credit 




JEL: E0, E6, P20, P21, P23, P26 











   2
BARTER, CREDIT AND WELFARE: 
A theoretical inquiry into the barter phenomenon in Russia 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Russian and Western scholars alike have devoted considerable attention to the causes and 
consequences of the growth in the volume of commodity transactions among Russian firms 
during the 1990s.  Unlike the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe that exhibited 
an increase in the use of money in transactions between firms as the emergence of product and 
factor markets replaced central planning, barter transactions in Russia not only continued during 
the transition process, but also increased over time.  Figure 1 documents the relatively high the 
share of barter in industrial sales in Russia:  increasing from 10% of total transactions in 1992, to 
a high of 50-60% in 1998, and a significant decline after the financial crisis in August 1998, 
falling to 10-15% of total industrial sales by the end of 2001.  Although not seen in Figure 1, the 
share of barter transactions in Russia grew even as inflation declined after 1995. This is reflected 
in the negative correlation between barter and inflation shown in Table 1. 
Barter transactions were possible at an unprecedented scale in Russia’s transition 
economy, in part, because a double coincidence of wants routinely occurred.  Food producers 
and processors traded goods; suppliers to construction or construction materials companies were 
willing to take payment in services or product.  Similar types of pairings were widespread in the 
early 1990s, motivated in large part by deteriorating economic and financial conditions, and 
facilitated by the Soviet legacy of firms, which routinely, albeit unofficially, traded goods to 
facilitate plan fulfillment (Berliner 1957, Freris 1984, Gregory and Stuart 1986). Yet frequently, 
multiple firms were involved in what would have been a single transaction in a cash economy.  
Barter chains emerged as Russian enterprise directors negotiated for the acquisition of inputs, 
sales and delivery of output, and means for payment of their workers in cash or in-kind.
1 
                                                 
1 Humphrey (2000) identifies three different kinds of barter arrangements involving more than two firms: (i) lineal 
barter chains with a series of discrete swaps; (ii) star-shaped barter chains, where “a trader at the center makes a 
series of deals between himself and a number of other firms in order to convert the product he starts with into the 
good he wants (usually money)”; and (iii) circular barter chains, where the initial transactor is also the end transactor 
in a series of trades. See also Clarke (2000), Ledeneva and Seabright (2000) and Linz (2001).   3
While competing explanations regarding the cause of barter transactions in Russia exist, 
all relate in some way to financial considerations, either at the macroeconomic or microeconomic 
level.  Litwak (1997), Pissarides et al (2002), and others observe the serious constraints faced by 
Russian entrepreneurs on external financing.
2  In many analyses of barter transactions in Russia, 
however, the distinction between (and relative importance of) macroeconomic and 
microeconomic financial conditions is not clearly delineated.  This has contributed to two strands 
in the literature – one strand views barter as a choice made by firms and one strand views barter 
as dictated by circumstance.  
Three major explanations argue that barter is a choice made by firms. One explanation 
involves the “virtual economy” hypothesis where firms use barter to hide revenues and 
exaggerate costs in order to avoid restructuring (Gaddy and Ickes 1998, 2002; Goldman 1998a, 
1998b).  Another explanation states that barter allows firms to take advantage of their monopoly 
power to price discriminate (Guriev and Kvassov 2004; Ellingsen 1998; Prendergast and Stole 
1996).  In a third explanation, firms choose barter to avoid taxation.  Russia’s tax system prior to 
1998 was confiscatory, based on revenues and not on profits.  Thus, it was rational to avoid taxes 
because they could account for up to 120% of revenues.  Moreover, during the early stages of 
Russia’s transition, tax payment was due upon payment for the transaction.  In Russia’s near 
hyper-inflationary environment between 1992 and 1995, delaying payments significantly 
reduced the actual tax burden (Aukutsionek 1998, 2001).  
Among the analyses that view barter transactions in transition economies as dictated by 
circumstance, one branch of the literature argues that barter results from “poor” financial 
circumstances driven by under-developed institutions.  One such argument is based on the poor 
payment system in Russia during the 1990s when monetary payments going through the banking 
system took up to six months to clear.  In this environment, barter represented a quicker and 
cheaper way to conduct transactions (Goldman 1998a, 1998b; Hendley et al 1998; Kuznetsov 
and Kuznetsova 2003; Yakovlev 2000).  
Another set of explanations refer to Russia’s fiscal and monetary policies. When the 
federal government issued short-term bonds (GKOs) to finance their expenditures, loans became 
too costly, and firms moved away from using banks (Dutta 2000; Pinto et al 2000, Posner 1998).  
                                                 
2 Litwak (1997) reports that credit to the non-financial sector in Russia fell from 20% of GDP in 1993 to less than 
10% in 1996 as the GKO market developed.  For a discussion of the lack of access to bank financing by firms, see   4
High interest rates generated by government policies contributed to create credit-rationing 
situations, obliging firms to engage in barter transactions to survive until economic and financial 
conditions improve (Bevan et al 2001; Brana and Maurel 2000; Commander and Mummsen 
2000; Commander et al 2002; Linz and Krueger 1998; Makarov and Kleiner 1996, 2000; Marin 
2002; Marin and Schnitzer 1999). At the same time, however, when interest rates are high, firms 
not facing cash constraints may also be better off if they lend their cash and switch to barter 
(Linz and Luca 2002).  In any case, the interest rate is the key explanatory variable.  Regardless 
of whether the cause of barter is choice or circumstance, both of these situations generate a 
multiplier effect that spreads barter from particular pairs of firms to the rest of the economy.  
In addition to debate over whether barter is voluntary or involuntary, a second debate 
focuses on whether the unprecedented scale of barter transactions has been a positive or a 
negative phenomenon for Russia and other transition economies. There is a strong division on 
this issue. The virtual economy explanation considers barter as a negative phenomenon since it 
allows firms to avoid restructuring (Gaddy and Ickes 1998, 2002). Guriev et al (2002) assert that 
barter transactions among firms in distressed financial conditions have external negative effects 
on profitable firms and thus undermine efficiency. Carlin et al (2000) claim that barter has 
negative impact on productivity in Russia.  Kim and Pirttila (2004) maintain that barter causes 
cash prices to fall, sending recession signals. On the other hand, Commander et al (2002) and 
others claim that, with an economy in recession, barter allows output to rise, or at least not to 
fall.  Ellingsen (1998) claims that barter improves the welfare of the firm.  
The present paper contributes to the barter literature in several ways. First, the previous 
work on barter transactions in transition economies sees the welfare issue associated with barter 
transactions from the point of view of firms and production.  We consider the welfare issue not 
only from the point of view of producers, but also consumers.  Second, most of the previous 
work on barter transactions in transition economies has been empirical in nature and, as far as we 
know, none of the previous work uses welfare theory to provide an answer to question of 
whether barter has been a positive or negative phenomenon in Russia or other transition 
economies. We set up a general equilibrium model and use the tools of welfare theory to provide 
a more definitive answer to this question.  Third, most of the previous literature links the 
emergence and growth of barter to the deterioration of a number of important macroeconomic 
                                                                                                                                                             
Schoors (2001) and Gara (2001).   5
indicators.  We incorporate these observed linkages.  However, we analyze the problem from a 
different perspective than is found in the existing literature.  We compare an economy that has 
access to a barter technology to an identical economy without access to barter.  In this way, we 
can properly assess whether the existence of barter has had positive or negative effects. 
Section II presents the model and analyzes its operation.  The model concentrates on 
fiscal and monetary factors, but does not consider the virtual economy and price discriminating 
explanations.
3  While the model captures the transition environment in several ways, it is not as 
well-suited to analyzing barter transactions in developed market economies.  In developed 
market economies, like the USA or the UK, for example, barter is a growing industry because 
the costs associated with finding a partner are reduced with the use of modern computers and the 
internet. Indeed, barter has become more common, especially among small firms, in the last two 
decades as information acquisition opportunities expanded (Marvasti and Smyth 1999).  In 
developed market economies, barter works alongside a well-established financial sector and does 
not cause any information asymmetric problem, yet  barter is unlikely to become a significant 
part of total transactions.  In contrast, in transition economies, especially in Russia’s transition 
economy, barter has been a large share of total transactions, caused in part by under-developed 
and mal-functioning financial markets and the mismanagement of monetary policies, and in part 
by the incentive and opportunity to use barter has as a tool for tax evasion.  The model we 
develop to analyze barter transactions in transition economies is thus not suited for a similar 
analysis of barter transactions in developed market economies
4.  
Section III examines the welfare implications of bartering. We look at the effect of barter 
on firms’ production as well as consumers’ utility.  Section IV focuses on the barter phenomenon 
in Russia, and offers concluding remarks. 
II. THE MODEL   
The model consists of four kinds of agents: households, firms, lenders and a government. 
Households demand consumption goods. Each firm has a monopoly on the goods it sells. This 
                                                 
3 Ivanenko (2004), Marin (2002), and Marin and Schnitzer (1999) find strong empirical evidence against the virtual 
economy. 
4 Kutnetsov and Kuznetsova (2003), and Pyle (2001) provide deeper analyses comparing barter in Russia and barter 
in western economies.   6
reflects the highly imperfect market structure of the Russian economy.
5 In fact, Russia’s price 
liberalization in the early 1990s was widely criticized as strengthening the monopolies created 
during the Soviet planned economy.  
Firms may or may not own cash to finance their transactions. Assume that there is a 
continuum [0,1] of cashless firms, and another [0, 1] of cash-owing firms. Lenders are risk-
neutral and the sole holders of financial wealth. 
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dj j d di i d u t t t ,  ρ  ∈ (0, 1), and  ( ) i dt  and  ( ) j dt  are the household’s 
consumption of good i and j, respectively, and i and j denote the goods produced by cashless 
firms and cash-owing firms respectively.  Since we are free to choose the units of measurement 
for output, we choose real wages. Then, the household’s budget constraint can be written as 





= +∫ ∫ dj j d P di i d P jt it , where Pit (Pjt) is the price of good i (j) at time t. The household’s 
problem is to maximize its utility function U subject to the budget constraint. If we assume a 
continuum [0,1] of households, the solution to this problem also gives total households’ demand 
functions as 
σ − = it
h
it P D  and 
σ − = jt
h
jt P D , where σ  ≡ 1/(1 – ρ) is the elasticity of substitution 
between two goods. 
Government’s total real expenditure, gt , is financed in part by the tax revenue, St, and in 
part by the issue of new debt, bt – bt–1.  Consequently, the government’s budget constraint is  
(2)  () 1 − − + = t t t t t b R b S g ,  
where Rt is the real gross interest rate. For simplicity’s sake, assume the government distributes 
its expenditures in the same way as households, so its demand function for goods i and j are 
t it
g
it g P D
σ − =  and  t jt
g
jt g P D
σ − = . Thus, total demand for each good is 
(3)  () t it it g P D + =
σ − 1  and  ( ) t jt jt g P D + =
σ − 1 . 
                                                 
5 Rosefielde (1999) analyzes why all power-seeking behaviors, including monopolies and other market 
imperfections, are decriminalized in Russia.   7
Firms. To conduct transactions, firms can use either cash or barter. There are two states of 
nature: good and bad. The good state occurs with probability q, and to produce x units of good i 
(j), firm i (j) incurs the cost function  ( ) cx x C = , where c > 0. However, in the bad state, firm i (j) 











j = ; the lower hi (hj) the riskier firm i (j)’s project. Suppose that in the 
bad state, firm’s receipts are not enough to cover costs
6. 
Cashless Firms. Consider first a firm that owns no cash. Let 
ml
it x  and 
ml
it P  denote output and 
price respectively that the cashless firm i sets at time t if it uses cash transactions. The superscript 
“m” denotes that the firm uses cash to make transactions and the superscript “l” denotes that it is 
cashless. If the firm owns no money, the firm can obtain a loan, using production as collateral.  
In the good state, the firm pays back the loan at the real gross interest rate Rt. In the bad state, the 










it x cR x P q E − = π . 
The cashless monopolist chooses the price-quantity combination that maximizes its expected real 
profits. Using (3) we find 
(4)  t
ml
it cKR P = , 
where  ρ = / 1 K  is the markup of the unit cost. The higher the real interest rate, the higher the 
relative price firm j sets. From (3) and (4), we obtain 
(5)  () ()
σ − + = t t
ml
it cKR g x 1 . 
Output is decreasing with respect to the interest rate, and both output and relative prices are 
independent of the firm’s project risk. Output also increases as government debt increases.  This 
is because monopolies react by increasing production as the demand for their products increases. 
Firm j’s before-tax expected profit if it uses cash for transactions is 













                                                 
6 Below it will be clear why we have chosen to introduce hj in the denominator.   8
Suppose now that firms have the network and/or social capital necessary for engaging in barter 
transactions; that is, firms have access to a barter technology. Consider a firm that chooses not to 
ask for cash loans, but instead asks for barter credit  --  the firm chooses to “borrow” the inputs 
needed from other firms and arranges to repay the loan in goods produced from these inputs. 
Marin and Schnitzer (2003) offer an excellent analysis of how barter is used to collateralize trade 
credit.  
Barter credit transactions impose upon the firm costs that would not be incurred if the 
firm conducted cash transactions only. To model the barter technology in a simple way, we 
assume that the barter credit cost takes an iceberg form: when a firm finances its inputs using 
barter credit, for every unit of good j sold, a fraction τ > 0 evaporates.
7 Thus, its before-tax 
























it P  and 
bl
it x  denote price and output of firm i at time t if the firm is cashless and conduct 
barter transactions. In this case, from the monopoly problem we obtain 



















The price is lower when the barter technology becomes less cumbersome (lower τ) or the project 
is less risky (higher hi). From (3), the firm’s output is 



























Output increases if there is a lower barter cost or less risky projects. As in the previous case, it 
also increases as government debt increases. The expected profit for firm j if it barters is 


























Unlike the cash credit case, the factor hi is present here. This occurs because the firm, not the 
lender, faces the risk when barter is employed.  
                                                 
7 The idea of iceberg cost was proposed by Samuelson (1952) as a shortcut to incorporate some costs in a model 
without the need of endogenize the working of that particular industry. That approach is widely used in the new 
economic geography and evolutionary economics literatures (see Fujita et al 2000).   9
Consider now the firm’s decision about whether to barter or borrow. Cashless firm j asks 
for a loan if this generates higher after-tax profit; that is, if the after-tax expected profit using 
cash transactions is higher than that using barter. Let st denote the tax rate paid by firms that 
conducts cash transactions. Thus, firm i’s after-tax expected profit if it conduct cash transactions 
is ()
ml
it t E s π − 1 . Since firms that engage in barter have better opportunities to evade taxes (Marin, 
Kaufmann and Gorochowskij 2000), assume that the firm conducting barter transactions evades 
taxes such that its net profit increase by a factor φ, where  ( ) t s − < φ < 1 / 1 1 .  That is, if firm i 
conducts barter transactions, its after-tax expected profit is  ( )
bl
it t E s π − φ1 . Thus, from (6) and (9) 








i − τ − φ
−
< − σ σ − σ 1 / 1 / 1 1 /
1
. 
Observe also that the higher the barter cost (τ), the bigger the right-hand side in (10). In this 
situation, the inequality tends to hold, and fewer firms will choose to barter. As τ increases, 
barter eventually becomes unaffordable. This echoes the traditional literature, which considers 
barter as so inefficient that it is always dominated by some medium of exchange. On the other 
hand,  φ represents the tax evasion incentive to barter. The higher the tax evasion incentive 
(higher φ), the smaller that right-hand side in (10), and thus, the higher the incentive to engage in 
barter activities. 
In this paper, we assume that τ is small enough so as to make the barter technology 
feasible. Define µ as follows:  
(11)  () {} φ τ = µ , , , 1 t
l l










− τ − φ
−
= φ τ − σ σ − σ 1 / 1 / 1 1 /
1
, ,.  
l
t µ  is the cutoff risk level that makes a firm 
indifferent between conducting either cash or barter transactions. If the real interest rate (Rt) is 
such that  () 1 , , ≥ φ τ t
l R Z , inequality (10) always holds and all cashless firms conduct cash 
transactions. Yet, as Rt increases, 
l
t µ  eventually becomes less than one; firm i will choose to 
barter if 
l
t i h µ > , and ask for a loan otherwise. In other words, firms whose projects have a high 
probability of success choose to barter, and those with probability of success less than µ prefer to   10
use cash for transactions.
8 The fact that the safest firms tend to use barter credit and the riskiest 
firms use cash credit suggests that it must be easier to enforce payment to firms using barter 
credit than to firms using cash [Marin and Schnitzer (1999), p. 293]. 
Firms Owning Cash. A firm that owns cash can use the cash to finance its project or lend it and 
ask for barter credit. If it uses its cash to finance its project, then it bears the risk. Thus, firm j’s 
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+ − = π , 
where the superscript “c” denotes that the firm own cash. The last term reflects the opportunity 






































σ − 1 1
1
. 
The firm’s profit is 
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and firm j’s profit becomes 




























                                                 
8 The fact that the less risky firms quit the credit market as interest rates increase is a consequence of the lemons 
argument and is one of the main conclusions in the credit rationing literature, see Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) for a 
survey in credit rationing. The lemons argument in the context of the barter literature in Russia is also recognized in 
Huang, Marin and Xu (2004).   11
Thus, from (13) and (15), firm j obtains higher profit financing the project with its own resources 
if 
(16)  ( ) φ τ < − , , 1 j
c
t h Z R , where  () ()
()() () 1 1
1
, ,








+ = φ τ






q h Z . 
Define 
c
t µ  such that  




t Z R .  
The right-hand term in (16) is positive if ( ) 1 1 < φ τ −
σ . This reflects the fact that, for firms to have 
the incentive to use cash, the barter cost cannot be too small. Assume thus that ()1 1 < φ τ −
σ . 
When the interest rate is low, the left-hand term in the last inequality is small and firms holding 
cash use their financial resources to finance their investment. However, as the interest rate 
increases, the left-hand term in (16) also increases. Eventually, the inequality does not hold and 
firms with financial resources find it convenient to switch into barter activities and lend the cash. 
As in the case of cashless firms, the less risky firms have the highest incentive to engage in 
barter activities. 
Notice that in the deduction of inequalities (10) and (16), we have assumed that firms are 
monopolists. Are these results robust to that assumption? Since the markup K decreases as 
markets become more competitive, and since K does not appear in (10) and (16), we conclude 
that results are robust as long as markets are imperfect. When markets are perfectly competitive, 




it E E π = π . Thus, firms are indifferent between using cash or conducting barter 
transactions. It will be apparent that the results below hold for any K > 1 and so they are also 
robust to the market structure assumption. 
Output and Output Value. Let us compare output and output value when the firm decides to 




it x x >  when the 
firm switches to barter if  
(17)  φ − > τ / 1 q . 




it x x >  when the firm engages into barter if 
(18)  φ − > τ / 1 1 .   12
By assumption,  1 < q  and  1 > φ .  Thus, the last two inequalities state that the firm increases 
output when it engages in barter activities if the barter cost is high. The reason is that, if the 
barter cost is too high, by the time firms decide to engage in barter, the interest rate is very high 
and the output produced by firms conducting cash transactions is already too small. 
Notice also that inequalities (17) and (18) do not hold if the tax incentive to barter (φ) is 
too big. The reason is that when the tax incentive to barter, tax evasion allow firms to obtain 
much higher after-tax profits, so firms respond by reducing output in order to diminish risk. By 
construction, φ is upper-bounded by  ( ) t s − 1 / 1 . Thus, a sufficient condition for (17) and (18) to 
hold is that  t s > τ , that is, barter cost is greater than the tax rate. On the other hand, if the tax 
incentive to barter is small (low φ), inequality (18) always holds and cash-owing firms always 
increase output when they engage in barter activities. 
Lemma 1: When firms switch to barter activities, we have that 
(a) If the barter cost is high, so (17) and (18) hold, firms increase output. A sufficient 
condition for this to happen is that  t s > τ ; 
(b) If the tax evasion incentive to barter is too high, firms decrease output;  
(c) If the tax incentive to barter is small, cash-owing firms always increase output; 
If conditions (17) and (18) hold, as interest rates increase, firms that keep using cash decrease 
output and those switching into barter increase output. Thus, the net effect on total output will 
depend on the distribution function. However, Figure 2 suggests that aggregate output decreases 
as barter was increasing. Table 1 confirms this suggestion showing that the correlation between 
both variables (-0.78) is negative and significant.
9  These findings suggest that either conditions 
(17) and (18) may not hold or the decrease in output of all firms that keep using cash is higher 
than the increase of those that switch into barter. In any case, firms that were previously 
conducting barter transactions maintain their output level.  
Russia has access to barter technology but would have Russia done better if it did not 
have access to barter? Let us find aggregate output assuming that firms have access to barter, and 
compare it to the aggregate output, assuming that firms do not have access to barter. Since (17) 
                                                 
9 Commander and Mummsen (2000) and Commander et al (2002) provide more exhaustive empirical support to this 
finding.   13
and (18) may not hold if the tax evasion incentive to barter φ is too high, for the purpose of this 
exercise and for the sake of simplicity, assume that φ = 1.  
Consider first the case of cashless firms. Let 
ml
t Q  denote the aggregate output of cashless 
firms conducting cash transactions. From (4) and (5), we have 
() () ( ) t t t
ml
t H g cKR Q µ + =
σ − 1
1 , 







t dh h f H
0
 is the distribution function that characterize the distribution of hi 
across cashless firms and  () i
l h f  its associated density functions. Assume that  ( ) i
l h f  is 
continuous and bounded. From (7) and (8), we obtain aggregate output of cashless firms 
conducting barter transactions 
() () ∫
µ




































t Q Q Q + = . On the other hand, from (4) and (5), 
aggregate output of cashless firms if they did not have access to barter is  () ( ) t t
l
t g cKR Y + =
σ − 1
1 . 
Considering (11), we have 






t J g cK Y Q µ + = −
σ −
1
1 1  
where   () () () ∫
µ







































H J . 
When the interest rate is small, so  1 = µ
l




t Y Q = . Suppose now that the interest 
rate is high enough so  1 < µ
l
t . Taking derivatives with respect to 
l
t µ , 































































If the interest rate increases to more than R
l, where  ( ) 1 , , = φ τ
l l R Z , some cashless firms switch to 
barter. The second term is always negative. If  q − > τ 1 , the first term in 
l
t d dJ µ / 1  is negative and 
thus 0 / 1 < µ
l
t d dJ .Yet, if  q − > τ 1  the first term in 
l
t d dJ µ / 1  is positive and the sign is 
undetermined. Thus, we may conclude that there exist  [ ] q − ∈ τ 1 , 0
*  such that for 
* τ > τ ,   14
0 / 1 < µ
l
t d dJ  and as the interest rate increases, 
l




t Y Q −  increases, 
and cashless firms’ aggregate output is higher if they have access to a barter technology than if 
they do not have access. 
Given τ, since  ( )
l




t Y Q >  as 
l






t Y Q >  for any µ > µ
*.  Thus, if the interest rate is high enough, cashless firms’ 
aggregate output is higher if they have access to a barter technology than if they do not. The 
reason is that, as the interest rate keeps increasing, firms using cash reduce output, but the firm’s 
output has a lower bound if it has access to barter. 
Now, let 
c
t Q  and 
c
t Y  denote cash-owing firms’ aggregate output in the case when they 
have access to barter and when they do not, respectively. From (12), (14) and (16a), 






t J g cK Y Q µ τ − + = −
− σ σ −
2
1 1 1 1 , 
where  ()()




















+ τ − = µ
1 1 1















t dh h f
h
q
q dh h f
h
q
q J  and  ( ) i
l h f  is 
the density function cash-owing firms. It is apparent that  ( ) 0 1 2 = J  and that  0 / 2 < µ
c
t d dJ . Thus, 
when the interest rate increases, cash-owing firms’ aggregate output is higher if firms have 
access to barter than when they do not. The following lemma summarizes the previous 
discussion: 
Lemma 2: Assume that the tax incentive to barter (φ) is small enough, so firms are better off 
conducting cash transactions when the interest rate is very low, then,  
(a) Cash-owing firms’ aggregate output is higher if firms have access to barter 




t Y Q > ;  
(b) There exist a barter cost τ
*, 0 < τ
* < 1 – q, such that for any τ > τ
*, cashless firms’ 





t Y Q > . 
(c) There exists a risk level µ
*, such that for any µ > µ
*, cashless firms’ aggregate output 




t Y Q > . 
Figure 3 illustrates these results. R
l is the interest rate if  ( ) 1 , , = φ τ
l l R Z . For 
l R R ≤ , we have 
l l Y Q = . For R > R
l, there are two cases. When ( )
* τ > τ  (see Figure 3.a), 
l l Y Q >  always. But,   15
when ( )
* τ < τ   (see Figure 3.b), 
l l Y Q <  for 
* R R R
l < < , but 
l l Y Q >  as the interest rate becomes 
large, R > R
*. The case of aggregate output for cash-owing firms is depicted in Figure 3.a. To 
compare aggregate output, we must consider 
c l Q Q Q + =  and 
c l Y Y Y + = . For R > R
*, Q > Y 
and for R > R
*, the inequality can go either way. Yet, in any case, access to barter technology 
imposes a lower bound to the aggregate output.  This conditions does not hold if the economy 
does not have access to the alternative transaction technology. 
III.  WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF BARTER 
To evaluate the welfare implications of barter, we define credit market equilibrium 
conditions and consider alternative scenarios to analyze the fiscal policy impact on interest rates 
and individuals’ welfare. 
Credit Market Equilibrium 
Lenders and borrowers meet in the credit market to arrange loans. Borrowers’ total real demand 
for loans ( )
l










t dh h f cx b d
0
. 





t g F KR c b d + µ + =
σ − σ − 1
1  







t dh h f F
0
. The demand for loans 
l
t d  is a decreasing function with respect to the 
real interest rate.  
On the supply side, we assume that lenders cannot distinguish among borrowers and so 
there is a Stiglitz-Weiss loans supply curve, according to which the credit supply is an increasing 
function of the interest rate up to a point R . If the interest rate increases beyond that point, the 
loans supply curve becomes negatively sloped, and tighter credit markets result in credit 
rationing (see Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Denote the loans supply curve by  () t R W , where 
()0 ' > t R W  for   R Rt < , and  ()0 ' < t R W  for R Rt > . 
When interest rates are high, a situation of credit rationing occurs.  Cashless firms with 
access to barter have no other choice but to barter to avoid shutting down.  In these 
circumstances, barter is a welfare-enhancing alternative. A more interesting analysis involves the   16
welfare implications of barter when it is the result of a voluntary decision.
10 Below we discuss 
both cases.  
Credit market equilibrium condition is given by the following equation: 
(20)  () ( ) () ( ) t
l
t t t t g F KR c b R W + µ + =
σ − σ − 1
1 . 
Given parameters ρ and c, the distribution of firms according to risk,  () t
l h f  and  ( ) t
c h f , the 
barter cost τ and government debt bt, equations (4), (5), (7), (8), (11), (12), (14), (16) and (20) is 
a system of equations that characterizes prices and output set by every firm, 
mi




jt P  and 
bi
jt x  (for i = c, l), the interest rate, Rt and the cutoff points, 
l
t µ  and 
c
t µ . 
Lemma 4: Assuming that  R Rt < , the interest rate is an increasing function of government debt, 
the barter cost, the tax incentive to barter and the credit market risk. 
Proof: Define  () ( ) ( )( ) g F KR c b R W V
l + µ − − =
σ − σ − 1
1 ; since  0 / < ∂ µ ∂ t
l
t R , then 
() ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ] 0 / / 1 '
1 > ∂ µ ∂ µ − µ σ + + =
∂



























 and from (2) an increase in government debt, bt, must be 
accompanied by either a decrease in tax revenue,  t t dS db − =  or an increase in government 


































. Thus, the interest rate in increasing with 
































From (11), it is apparent that  0 / > τ ∂ µ ∂
l
t  and  0 / > φ ∂ µ ∂
l
t , so the interest rate is increasing with 
respect to the barter cost τ and the tax incentive to barter φ. Finally, notice from (11) that the 
credit market risk increases as 
l

















, we conclude 
that interest rate is increasing with respect to the credit market risk. 
                                                 
10 Noguera (2004) provides an analysis of voluntary and involuntary barter in Russia.    17
Q.E.D. 
Let us now turn to welfare considerations. For that purpose, we consider only variables in 
steady state.  This also allows us to drop the time subscript t. Since monotonic transformations of 
utility functions still represent the same preferences, using (1) we define the welfare function as 
() ( ) ∫ ∫





dj j d di i d . 





i h h µ < µ <  conduct monetary transactions, and all others barter. Thus, we can write 
individuals’ welfare as 


























From (5), (8), (12) and (14) we have 
(21)  () ( ) ()
c l g cK Ω + Ω + = Ω
ρ σ − 1
1 ,   where 
() () ∫ ∫
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To find the impact of an expansion of government indebtedness and the barter cost on the 
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.  The first terms on 
the right-hand side in (22a) and (22b) are negative, and reflect the lower output produced by 
firms remaining in the credit market as the interest rate rises.  If government borrowing is small 
enough so the interest rate is small and  1 = µ = µ
c l , all firms use money to conduct transactions 
and dµ/dR = 0. Therefore, any increase in government lending makes individuals worse off.  In 
other words, if the government keeps the debt within reasonable levels, the equilibrium interest 
rate remains moderate or low.  As government borrowing drives up the interest rate, costs of 
production rise, and firms respond to higher costs by cutting production and thus consumption 
goods available for households. Therefore, we conclude the following: 
Lemma 5: If fiscal and monetary policy are loose enough so that the equilibrium interest rate is 
such that  1 = µ = µ
c l , individuals’ welfare is a decreasing function of government borrowing.  
Suppose now that fiscal and monetary policy are tight, so the equilibrium interest rate is 
high and causes some firms to conduct barter transactions ( ) 1 , < µ µ
c l .  In this case, the second 
terms in (22a, b) are no longer zero since  0 / < µ dR d , and so ( )() 0 / < µ µ f dR d . This term 
reflects the reduction in quality and quantity of firms conducting cash transactions.  
Using some algebra and using (11) and (16a), it is straightforward to show that the term 
inside the brackets is always negative in (22b), but only negative in (22a) if  φ − > τ / 1 q . A 
sufficient condition for this to occur is that  t s > τ . For a given µ, these terms measure the 
difference in the firm’s output if it borrows instead of barters. Thus, the second terms in (22a, b) 
represent the net increase in overall production resulting from firms switching from cash to 
barter transactions for cashless and cash-owing firms. We may therefore conclude that there 
exists barter cost level, τ
**, 0 ≤ τ
** < 1 – q, such that  0 / > Ω dR d
c , and  0 / > Ω dR d
l  if 
* * τ > τ . 
Notice, however, that the net effect of an increase in government borrowing on welfare is 
ambiguous because it depends on the density function f.  If few firms switch to barter as the 
interest rate increases, the second terms in (22a, b) are small, the first terms dominate and the 
effect on welfare is negative. Yet, if many firms switch to barter, the increase in production of   19
those firms switching to barter is greater than the decline in production of those firms that 
continue to borrow, and individuals will be better off. The following lemma summarizes the 
above discussion: 
Lemma 6: If fiscal and monetary policy is so tight that both  1 , < µ µ
c l , as government 
indebtedness increases 
i)  The net effect on individuals’ welfare in undetermined, and depends on the density 
function at each particular point; 
ii)  If the density function is such that few firms switch to barter, the net increase in welfare 
is negative; 
iii) If  φ − > τ / 1 q  and the density function is such that many cashless firms switch to barter, 
the net effect on welfare is positive; a sufficient condition for this to occur is that  t s > τ , 
and 
iv) If the density function is such that many cash-owing firms switch to barter, the net effect 
on welfare is positive.  
Suppose now that firms did not have access to barter, then the welfare function would be 
() ( )
m M g cK Ω + = Ω
ρ σ − 1
























m dh h f R
h
q
q dh h f R  
Consider 
m c l Ω − Ω + Ω = ∆Ω . If this difference is positive, access to barter is welfare improving. 
From (11) and (16a), this can be written  
(23)  () () ( ) ∫
µ
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σ − σ T  and for the sake of simplicity we have made that φ = 1. For  1 = µ = µ
c l , 
it is apparent that  0 = ∆Ω . Suppose that  1 , < µ µ
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Since both  dR d
l / µ  and  dR d
c / µ  are negative, the last three terms are all positive, and the first 
term is positive if  q − > τ 1 . The analysis is analogous to that made for output in the discussion of 
lemma 2. The last two terms reflect the welfare advantage of barter due to the higher output of 
the cash-owing firms switching to barter. The second term reflects the fall in output due to higher 
interest rates of those cashless firms that would be bartering if that technology would be 
available. It appears positive since it makes Ω
M smaller. The first term reflects the net increase in 
output of cashless firms that would switch into barter, and is positive if  q − > τ 1 . In case of 
q − < τ 1 , firms switching to barter decrease output and the net effect depends on the density 
function. However, from (23), as 
l µ  and 
l µ  tends to zero, it is apparent that  0 > ∆Ω . This means 
that as the economy becomes risky, even in this case, barter is a welfare improving choice. 
Suppose now that interest rates have reached the credit rationing level,  R R = , in which 
they do not react to an increasing government debt  0 / = db dR , and 
l µ  and 
c µ  have reached a 
lower bound 
l µ  and 
c µ  respectively. Cash-owing firms that remain conducting cash transactions 
are not forced to switch to barter. However, there is a subset of firms  [ ]
l µ ⊂ Γ , 0  subject to credit 
rationing and forced to switch into barter. Assume again that  t t dS db − = , so dgt = 0, from (21) 
we find that  () ( )
l g cK ∆Ω + = ∆Ω
ρ σ − 1
1 , where  
() () ∫ ∫
Γ















− = ∆Ω i i
i
i i
l dh h f
h
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, where ∆Γ denote the set of rationed 
cashless firms. Since firms have no choice but to barter, output and thus welfare is higher if they 
have access to barter. 
Lemma 7: Assuming that the tax incentive to barter (φ) is small enough, and thus firms are better 
off conducting cash transactions when the interest rate is very low; then, 
(a) Individuals are always better off if cash-owing firms have access to a barter 
technology;   21
(b) There is a barter cost level τ
**,  q − < τ < 1 0
* * , such that for any 
* * τ > τ , individuals are 
better off if cashless firms have access to a barter technology; 
(c) If the interest rate is high enough, so the economy is risky, individuals are better off if 
cashless firms have access to a barter technology; and 
(d) In situations of credit rationing, individuals are better off if firms have access to 
barter. 
IV. COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The model above can be used to explain facts associated with the barter phenomenon in 
Russia.  Responding to the near hyper-inflationary period during the first years of transition 
when the Central Bank simply monetized the debt, the Russian government sharply cut the 
money growth rate and adopted legislation in 1995 that resulted in the financing of an important 
share of government expenditures by short-term bonds sold to the private sector. In fact, the 
money growth rate decreased from about 200% in 1994 to 21% in 2002.  Figure 4 illustrates the 
corresponding change in government debt:  it increased steadily until the end of 1998 and 
remained unchanged thereafter. The tightening of monetary policy reduced inflation, at the same 
time causing expected real interest rates to rise (see Figure 5).  Under the new economic and 
financial conditions, rational managers would be motivated to conduct barter transactions in 
order to conserve cash for investment in short-term government debt instruments. Such behavior 
contributes to the observed negative correlation between the inflation rate and the use of barter, 
shown in Table 1. The empirical evidence suggests that conditions (17) and (18) may not hold 
and thus, as the economy becomes tighter and interest rates increase, firms switch into barter and 
overall output falls, explaining the negative correlation between the industrial index and the use 
of barter shown in Figure 2. Consequently, the real money demand for transactions decreases and 
thus there must be a negative correlation between barter transactions and real money balances. 
Table 1 shows the significant correlations that support these three facts.  Commander and 
Mummsen (2000) and Commander et al (2002) provide a more exhaustive statistical analysis to 
support these results.  
According to the model, individuals switch to barter to avoid the high cost of acquiring 
debt; however, money is still a precious asset because of their use to facilitate transactions and 
the opportunity cost of lend it. Therefore, even firms that switch into barter would still prefer to   22
receive payments in cash, if possible (Commander and Mummsen 2000; Commander et al 2002; 
Krueger and Linz 2001). 
Now consider a firm with a high-risk project that borrows cash and wishes to make 
transactions with a firm with a low risk project. If the low-risk project firm prefers barter 
transactions and the high-risk project firm is buying, the latter pays in cash, and there will be a 
monetary transaction. If the high-risk project firm is selling and the low-risk project firm prefers 
to barter, the high-risk project firm is likely to have the impression that its partner trader does not 
have cash. This situation and its multiplier effect can make traders feel that they barter because 
their partner traders lack cash. Commander and Mummsen (2000), Commander et al (2002) and 
Linz and Krueger (1998) report surveys supporting this conclusion. 
The dramatic rise and fall of barter activity in Russia during the 1990s suggests that any 
explanations which ignore monetary and financial factors are inadequate. The model developed 
above explains the main contours of the relationship between barter activity among Russian 
firms and a number of monetary indicators.  The model allows for different strategic or 
behavioral patterns among firms, and shows how barter is a welfare-improving activity. We 
demonstrate that barter should not necessarily be seen as an undesirable cost imposed on firms 
and the society, but as an alternative technology that firms can use to hedge against increasing 
instability.   23
REFERENCES 
Aukutsionek, S. 1998. “Industrial Barter in Russia.” Communist Economies & Economic 
Transformation, 10, no. 2 (June): 179-188. 
Aukutsionek, S. 2001. “Barter: new data and comments.” Journal of East-West Business, 6(4): 
23-35 
Berliner, Joseph (1957) Factory and manager in the USSR (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press). 
Bevan, A., S. Estrin, B. Kuznetov, M. Schaffer, M. Angelucci, J. Fennema and G. Mangiarotti 
(2001) “The Determinants of Privatized Enterprise Performance in Russia,” William 
Davison Working Paper Number 452, June. 
Brana, S. and M. Maurel (2000) “Barter in Russia : Liquidity Shortage Versus Lack of 
Restructuring,” William Davison Institute at the University of Michigan, Working Paper 
number 271. 
Carlin, Wendy, Steven Fries, Mark Schaffer and Paul Seabright (2000) “Barter and non-
monetary transactions in transition countries: evidence from a cross-country survey” in 
Paul Seabright (ed.) The Vanishing Rouble. (New York: Cambridge University Press), 
pp. 236-256. 
Clarke, Simon (2000) “The Household in a Non-Monetary Market Economy,” in Seabright (ed) 
The Vanishing Rouble , pp. 176-206. 
Commander, Simon and Christian Mummsen (2000) “The Growth of Non-Monetary 
Transactions in Russia: Causes and Effects,” in Paul Seabright (ed) The Vanishing 
Rouble. (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 114-146. 
Commander, Simon, Irina Dolinskaya and Christian Mummsen (2002) “Determinants of Barter 
in Russia: an empirical analysis,” Journal of Development Economics, April, 67(2): 275-
307. 
Dutta, Jayasri (2000) “Some Lasting Thing: barter and the value of money,” in Seabright (ed) 
The Vanishing Rouble , pp. 15-34. 
Ellingsen, Tore (1998) “Payments in Kind,” Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, 
No. 244, Stockholm School of Economics, 1998 (revised 2000). 
Freris, Andrew (1984) The Soviet Enterprise (New York: St. Martins Press).   24
Krugman, Paul, Masahisa Fujita and Anthony J. Venables, “The Spatial Economy: city, regions 
and international trade,” The MIT Press, 2000 
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes (1998) “Russia's Virtual Economy,” Foreign Affairs. 
Sepember.-October; 77(5): 53-67 
Gaddy, Clifford G. and Barry W. Ickes (2002) “Russia's virtual economy.” Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press; xiii, 306 
Gara, Mario (2001) “The Emergence of Non-Monetary Means of Payment in the Russian 
Economy,” Post-Communist Economies  13 (1): 5-39 
Goldman, Marshall (1998a) “The Russian Ruble and Why It Collapsed,” Challenge, November-
December; 41(6): 9-13 
Goldman, Marshall (1998b) “The Cashless Society,” Current History downloaded from 
http://www.luc.edu/faculty/jostrow/Goldman.htm 
Gregory, Paul R. and Robert C. Stuart (1986)  Soviet Economic Structure and Performance, 
Third edition, Harper and Row: New York 
Guriev, Sergei and Dmitri Kvassov (2004) “Barter for Price Discrimination,” International 
Journal of industrial Organization, March, 22(3): 329-50 
Guriev, Sergei, Igor Makarov and Matilde Maurel (2002) “Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia,” 
Journal of Comparative Economics December 30(4): 635-56 
Hendley, Kathryn, Peter Murrel and Randi Ryterman (1998). “Law, Relationships and Private 
Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russia Enterprises,” University of Maryland, 
Department of Economics, Electronic Working Papers. 
Huang, Haizhou, Dalia Marin and Chenggang Xu (2004). “Financial Crisis, Economic Recovery 
and banking Development in Former Soviet Union Economies” IMF Working Paper 
W/04. 
Humphrey, Caroline (2000) “An Anthropological View of Barter in Russia” in Seabright, Paul 
(ed) The Vanishing Rouble, pp. 71-92. 
Ivanenko, Vlad (2004) “Searching for the Value-Subtraction in the Russian Economy,” Journal 
of Comparative Economics 32 (2): 88-104 
Jaffee, D. and J. Stiglitz  (1990). “Credit Rationing,” in the Handbook of Monetary Economics, 
vol. 2, B. M. Friedman and F. H. Hahn (eds.), Chapter 16   25
Kim, Byung-Yeon and Jukka Pirttila (2004) “Money, Barter and Inflation in Russia,” Journal of 
Comparative Economics June 32(2): 297-314 
Krueger, Gary and Linz, Susan J. (2001) “Virtual Reality: Barter and Restructuring in Russian 
Industry,” Problems of Post-Communism September/October 49(5): 1-3. 
Kutnetsov, Andrei and Olga Kuznetsova (2003) “Institutions, Business and the State in Russia,” 
Europe-Asia Studies, 55(6): 907-922. 
Ledeneva, Alena and Paul Seabright (2000) “Barter in Post-Soviet Societies: What does it look 
like and why does it matter?” in Seabright (ed) The Vanishing Rouble , pp. 93-113. 
Linz, Susan J. and Gary Krueger (1998) “Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's Transition 
Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanisms” Comparative Economic Studies, 40(2), 
Summer, pages 5-52. 
Linz, Susan J. (2001) “Restructuring with What Success? A Case Study of Russian Firms” 
Comparative Economic Studies, 43(1), Spring, pages 75-99. 
Linz, Susan J and Alina Luca (2002), “Security and Finance:  A Case Study of Russian Firms” 
MSU Working Paper (November). 
Litwak, John (1997)   “Development of Financial Markets and Corporate Governance in the 
Russian Federation,” paper presented at AAASS meetings in Seattle, Washington 
(November). 
Makarov, V., and G. Kleiner (1996) “Barter in the Economy of the Transition Period.” Matekon, 
33, no. 3, (Spring): 31-54. 
Makarov, V. and G. Kleiner (2000) “Barter in Russia: An Institutional Stage” 
Problems of Economic Transition 42(11), March, pages 51-79. 
Marin, Dalia (2002) “Trust versus Illusion: what is driving demonetization in the former Soviet 
Union,” Economics of Transition 10(1): 173-200. 
Marin, Dalia and Monika Schnitzer (1999) “The Economic Institution of International Barter,” 
Economic Journal April 2002; 112(479): 293-316. 
Marin, Dalia, Daniel Kaufmann and Bodhan Gorochowskij (2000) “Barter in Transition 
Economies: competing explanations confront Ukrainian data,” in Seabright (ed) The 
Vanishing Rouble, Cambridge University Press, pp. 207-235. 
Marin, Dalia and Monika Schnitzer (2003) “Creating Creditworthiness through Reciprocal 
Trade,” Review of International Economics February; 11(1): 159-174.   26
Marvasti, A. and Smyth, David J. 1999. “The Effect of Barter on the Demand for Money: an 
empirical analysis,” Economics Letters, 64(1): 73-80.  
Noguera, José (2004) “The Mechanism Transmission to Barter,” CERGE-EI manuscript. 
Pinto, Brian, Vladimir Drebentsov and Alexander Morozov (2000). “Give Macroeconomic 
Stability and Growth in Russia a Chance,” Economics of Transition, Volume 8(2), pp. 
297-324 
Pissarides, Francesca, Miroslav Singer and Jan Svejnar (2002) “Objectives and Constraints of 
Entrepreneurs: Evidence from Small and Medium Size Enterprises in Russia and 
Bulgaria,” Journal of Comparative Economics September, 31(3): 503-31 
Posner, Jan (1998) “Monetary Disruptions and the Emergence of Barter in FSU Economies,” 
Communist Economies and Economic Transformation June 10(2): 157-177 
Prendergast, Canice and Lars Stole (1996) “Mandated Countertrade as a Strategic Commitment,” 
Journal of International Economics, February, 40(1-2): 67-84. 
Pyle, William (2002) “Overbanked and Credit-Starved: a paradox of the transition,” Journal of 
Comparative Economics 30: 25-50. 
Rosefielde, Steven (1999) “Russia's Warped Transition: The destructive consequences of 
ethnically unconstrained utility seeking,” Eastern Economic Journal 25(4): 459-476 
Paul Samuelson “The transfer problem and the transport cost: the terms of trade when 
impediments are absent,” Economic Journal vol 62, 1952 
Schoors, Koen  (2001) “The Credit Squeeze during Russia's Early Transition,” Economics of 
Transition 9 (1): 205-228 
Stiglitz, Joseph and Andrew Weiss (1981) “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information.” American Economic Review 71, 3 (June), 393-410. 
Yakovlev, Andrei (2000) “Barter in the Russian Economy: Classification and Implications 
(Evidence from the Case Study Analyses)” Post-Communist-Economies,  September, 
12(3):279-91.   27
 
TABLE 1: Correlation coefficients: Barter and macroeconomic indicators 
Correlation barter share - real money balances  -0.57 
Correlation barter share – inflation  -0.63 
Correlation barter share – industrial index  -0.78 
Source: IFS/IMF (real money and inflation) 
   Russian Economic Barometer (Barter share) 
   Russian Economic Trends (Industrial Index) 
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Source:  Russian Economic Barometer (summer 2002) 
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FIGURE 3 
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